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M. he international trading of corporate
securities has flourished in the past
decade. In just several years, the volume
of this international trade has increased
tenfold (see figure 1), accompanied by
heavy investment in automated systems
to handle the expanded sales and pur-
chases of the securities. This automation,
however, has had only a limited impact
on the timeliness and accuracy of inter-
national settlement.
Trading volumes continue to swell, and
each country has continued to operate
under its own settlement procedures.
No two securities markets settle trades
in precisely the same way; each ad-
heres to unique standards and time
frames. Without common standards or
compatible clearance systems, the
result has been an increasing difficulty
in operating securities clearance sys-
tems, which match trades and transfer
securities and funds—the nuts and
bolts of securities exchange.
Lack of coordination among securities
exchange markets not only slows trade,
but also is costly. Securities houses
bear the risk of deals not being con-
cluded on time—and the additional
cost if they are not concluded at all.
London exchanges, for example, spent
$25 million to $33 million each in
1987 on the interest payments for bor-
rowings against unsettled deals.
The stock market crash of October
1987 highlighted the inefficiency,
economic costs, and risk inherent in the
current international system. Fully 40
percent of all transactions failed to set-
tle by contract date at the time of the
crash, increasing the pressure to reform
and standardize trading procedures.
All countries recognize the problem,
but there has as yet been no coordina-
tion in the efforts to reform and stan-
dardize international securities trade.
Within the past year, one international
organization, the Group of Thirty
(G-30), has made specific recommenda-
tions for the clearance and settlement
of international securities trades. A
private-sector group, the G-30 com-
prises bankers, investors, traders, regu-
lators, and bank officials concerned
with the basic mechanisms underlying
the international financial system.
The group's recently evolved Steering
Committee, composed of members
from eight countries, has been man-
dated to propose suggestions for im-
proving world securities markets by
1992, coinciding with the plan for es-
tablishing a single internal market in
Europe by that date. Unlike the
European Economic Community's goal
of free access to all types of markets
within its 12 member states, the G-30's
recommendations focus specifically on
reducing the risk and cost of trading in
The dramatic increase in the volume
of international securities trading has
strained the present system of settling
trades. The costs and risks of such
trading can no longer be ignored. An
international organization, the Group
of Thirty, has recommended changes
in the structure of financial markets
to minimize these problems.
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financial markets worldwide. The
group offers a challenging framework
for improving the current situation in
world securities markets.
• The G-30 Report
In its March 1989 report, "Clearance
and Settlement Systems in the World's
Securities Markets," the G-30 set forth
a nine-step strategy for reducing the
risk and increasing the efficiency of in-
ternational securities clearance and set-
tlement (see box 1). A secondary, but
necessary, intermediate goal is to foster
standardization among the groups in-
volved in securities transactions. Of the
nine specific recommendations in the
G-30 report, the United States is al-
ready in compliance with seven.
A U.S. Steering Committee has recently
reviewed the areas in which the United
States is not in compliance: moving to a
t+3 (trade date plus three business days)
settlement period for corporate secur-
ities, and adopting a same-day funds
payment schedule for settlement of
those trades. Same-day funds earn in-
terest from the day received. Currently,
some investors pay for corporate
securities with next-day funds, which
do not earn interest and cannot be used
for settlement until the following day.
The Steering Committee's proposal, is-
sued in March 1990, urges that the
United States shift to the same-day
funds transfer process, instead of its cur-
rent next-day funds payment standard.
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• The Current Settlement Process
Presently, stock trades in the United
States do not result in immediate
delivery of the security in exchange for
payment. Current procedures call for
delivery on t+5, five business days
later. During those five business days,
both the buyer and seller (or their inter-
mediaries) are at risk: either party
could conceivably fail to honor its com-
mitment. The longer the time before
securities are exchanged for cash, the
greater the likelihood that the value of
the securities will change, increasing
the incentives for one party to default.
Many market participants have con-
cluded that the increasing volume and
volatility of financial markets makes
the risk too great to ignore.
The most direct way to address this
problem is to reduce the time between
the trade date and the exchange of
securities for cash. However, several
important steps must occur during that
time. First, the brokers must confirm
the transaction by notifying their cus-
tomers of the terms of the trade. The
customers, in turn, must affirm, or
agree to those terms as communicated
by the broker. Next, the trade is
cleared, which creates statements of
obligation. One party must deliver
securities, while the other must deliver
funds. Finally, the trade is settled, at
which time both parties discharge the
obligations created at clearance.
These steps must occur in proper se-
quence, and none of them is automatic
or immune to error. Shortening the time
between the trade date and settlement of
that trade leaves less room for inefficien-
cy and mistakes. This emphasizes the
need for dealers and brokers to submit
all trades for confirmation by day t+1,
and for customers to have access to an
interactive affirmation system.
The problems of international securities
transactions are still more complex, be-
cause markets do not yet have stan-
dardized procedures. For example, al-
though the United States does not yet
settle by t+3, it does at least use rolling
settlement. Trades are settled five busi-
ness days from the trade date, regard-
less of the time of the trade. In contrast,
France uses a monthlong account
period. All trades during the account
period settle on the same day. TheBOX1
The nine recommendations of
the Group of Thirty, designed
to reduce the risk and lower
the cost of trading securities
internationally.
1. Comparisons should be estab-
lished between direct market par-
ticipants (brokers, exchange
members) by day t+1.
2. Indirect market participants
should be members of a positive-
affirmation comparison system
by 1992.
3. Each country should have a
central securities depository
(CSD, used to immobilize
securities) by 1992.
4. Each country should imple-
ment a netting system by 1992,
unless volume is low enough to
permit otherwise.
5. A delivery versus payment
system should be in place by
1992.
6. Payment in same-day funds
should be adopted.
7. Rolling settlement should be
adopted. No later than 1990,
final settlement by t+5 should be
the rule. The ultimate goal is t+3
by 1992.
8. Securities lending as a means
of expediting settlement should
be encouraged.
9. The numbering of securities
and message codes should be
standardized.
differing systems mean that trades be-
tween French and U.S. investors en-
counter yet another layer of cost, risk,
and potential error. This lack of stan-
dardization adds to the problems finan-
cial markets face in limiting risk and
lowering costs.
The United States must also institute
changes to conform to a second recom-
mendation by the G-30, the proposal to
settle all trades in same-day funds.
From the perspective of the financial
markets, same-day funds are safer. The
additional risk of paying with next-day
funds can be large enough to disrupt
trading: many banks refused to deliver
securities to Drexel Burnham Lambert's
broker-dealer subsidiary after the parent
corporation entered Chapter 11 unless
they were paid with same-day funds.
• The Transition Phase and
Potential Pitfalls
Markets throughout the world are not
likely to incorporate the G-30's recom-
mendations smoothly, including the
implementation of settlement by day
t+3 or the use of same-day funds.
Some markets must incur substantial
up-front costs and may not view the
benefits as sufficiently large. An impor-
tant advantage of the G-30's recom-
mendations is that none of the nine is
new; all are in place in various markets
throughout the world. For example, in
the U.S. Treasury bill market, trades
are settled either on the trade date or on
the next business day, well before t+3,
and settle in same-day funds. The prob-
lems facing other financial markets con-
cern implementation and coordination,
not invention.
Although the required procedures are
already in place in some markets, the
problems of implementation and coor-
dination can be real and large. For ex-
ample, the apparent 40 percent reduc-
tion in the settlement period from five
days to three is in fact even more ex-
treme. With five business days between
the trade date and the settlement date,
brokers and other market participants
could rely on an intervening weekend
to catch up with paperwork. This will
not always be possible with settlement
due at t+3, making affirmation and con-
firmation by t+1 even more important.
The G-30 also recognizes that consis-
tently making delivery of physical
securities by t+3 is impossible. Book-
entry systems, in which computer
entries entirely replace paper certifi-
cates of ownership, are the best method
for recording and transferring owner-
ship. A good alternative is a central
securities depository (CSD), such as the
Depository Trust Company. CSDs are
financial intermediaries that hold all
paper certificates immobile in a central
location, recording and transferring
ownership by means of computer
entries. Book-entry systems or CSDs
offer cost savings as well as faster trans-
fers. One problem with such systems is
that some local laws, both in the U.S.
and abroad, require the use of physical
securities. Unless the appropriate
authorities change these laws, they will
impede the movement toward book-
entry systems and could block their
constituents' access to financial markets.
In addition, the G-30 has refrained
from addressing political problems—at
the corporate, national, and internation-
al levels—that are likely to arise. For
example, using next-day funds permits
clearing banks to earn float; they retain
use of the funds for one more business
day. In 1985, the American Bankers
Association estimated that same-day
settlement could cost the banking in-
dustry $3 billion in lost float. The in-
dustry cannot forgo that much income
annually, and its members will be
forced to change their clearing fees to
compensate. Brokerage firms may need
fewer employees and have lower profit
margins under the automated systems
needed to meet the G-30's recommen-
dations. Even if total employment in
the brokerage industry remains con-
stant, the nature of jobs will change.
The implementation process will elim-
inate certain jobs, while increasing the
need for others. Employees whose jobs
are in jeopardy may resist and success-
fully delay the necessary changes.
Some countries have many of the
recommended procedures already inplace, while others must invest large
sums both in capital improvements and
in training personnel. France has essen-
tially completed the process of
dematerializing physical securities in
favor of a book-entry system, while
England has not yet even immobilized
securities in a CSD.
Will some countries resist implement-
ing portions of the recommendations?
If so, what will this mean for standard-
izing trading terms and for transactions
across national boundaries? Markets
that fail to conform to common stan-
dards will suffer cost and risk disad-
vantages relative to other markets, and
investors will choose to use the
markets that do adopt the G-30 recom-
mendations.
Finally, the G-30 has identified many
of the risks inherent in the proposed
system, and notes that they can be sur-
mounted using methods already in
place in other markets. For example,
markets can develop central clearing-
houses to guarantee that transactions
settle according to the terms of the
trade. To protect itself from the pos-
sibility of its members failing to per-
form, the clearinghouse can incor-
porate a risk-sharing arrangement
similar to those that futures exchanges
already use.
What the G-30 cannot do is uncover all
possible risks other entities may bear
because of the proposed system. For ex-
ample, under present trading systems,
the buyer and seller offer a faceless
commitment to perform, since they do
not know each other at the time of the
trade. Shortening the period between
the trade date and the execution of the
trade tends to limit the risk of this ar-
rangement, but ensuring delivery by
the target date of t+3 will require more
borrowing (and lending) of securities,
which is not riskless. In this case, the
G-30's recommendations may not
reduce total risk, but they do make the
credit commitment more explicit.
They reduce the risk of the faceless
commitment between the buyer and
seller, while increasing the risk be-
tween the borrower and lender.
• Conclusion
Large increases in trading volume have
strained the current system of settling in-
ternational securities trades and have
driven up the costs and risks of such
transactions. In addition, advances in
computers and communications technol-
ogy have made international trading a
common occurrence, introducing new
sources of cost and risk to financial mar-
kets. The Group of Thirty's recommen-
dations are an attempt both to coordinate
and to accelerate the evolution of world-
wide financial markets in response to the
changing nature of international trading.
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